CPYRGHT Burchill Replies

Your editorial. The Revisionists," was a rather intemperate attack on a modest study paper which I published last March under the title, "Chinese Aggression — Myth or Menace?" The purpose of the paper was to show how it was possible, partly because of incomplete information and partly because of nationalist bias, for reasonably honest Chinese, and Americans to view recent historical events in very different lights.

Apart from the personal attack on my professional competence and intellectual honesty, your editorial attacks three judgments which I suggested that our opponents might make from the events of 1950:

That the government of Syngman Rhee suffered a defeat in the election of May, 1950. This is not only a judgment which the Chinese might make; it was the judgment of the United Nations Commission which supervised the elections and monitored the campaign and which concluded that "The two leading parties in the old National Assembly suffered a heavy defeat, losing 70 per cent of their strength in the Assembly."

That /John Foster Dulles had used American aid as a lever in the attempt to unite the newly-elected Assembly in support of the President, Syngman Rhee.

Of course Dulles didn't threaten to cut off American aid if the Assembly failed to support Syngman Rhee; he only made it plain that continuance of that aid depended on how the Koreans in general, and the Assemblymen in particular, behaved themselves.* Meanwhile, as L. M. Goodrich puts it in Korea; a Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations: "The Administration in Washington —. since it saw no reasonably satisfactory alternative to the Rhee regime, it was unwilling' to risk the uncertainty which would follow its discrediting and defeat . . . To promote this evolution, the United States had powerful means at its disposal in the form of economic and military assistance." In fact, the \$110 million of U.S. aid carmarked for Korea for the year ending June 30, 1950, was persistently delayed,

and only a trickle of the funds having been released at the lime of Dulles' speech to the Korean Assembly. Few members of that Assembly can have had any doubts as to the meaning of his message.

That doubt exists as to whether the North or the South Koreans attacked first on June 24-25, 1950. Official tatements of North and South Korea conflict. No impartial bserver was able to confirm ither version. The Security Council, which could and, hould have investigated, reused to permit an investiga: tion and accepted without coroboration the South Korean ersion. Of course a doubt xists; even Professor Fairank, whose opening sentence your editorial quotes, in his oreign Affairs article, Octor er 15, 1950, makes no attempt b deal with this doubt, or to etermine who started the ar. No historian of integrity. can reach a definite conclus on on this point until more cyldence than the propaganda. statements of the governments

avolved is available. Syngman Rhee's broadcast his fellow-countrymen of e North on May 6, 1950, in cated a definite intention on, e part of the South Korean overnment to attack the orth, in a campaign to be cordinated with an "all-out sing" of sympathetic north-ners directed by the South brean radio. He had already edged himself in the previs December to secure the. dification of Korea, by force; f necessary, before the end! 1950. I think it very doubtul that he actually attempted his proposed attack; that more probably the North Koreans ainched an ill-advised precentive war in anticipation of hs attack; but the evidence support either view is inconclusive.

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Editor's Note: Mr. Burchill's ar icle contained the following sertence: "John Foster Dulles flew to Korea, and on June 19 addressed the South Korean National Assembly, pledging continued American aid, but only if Syngman Rhee's minority government continued in power." John Foster Dulles did not say a word in this speach about predicating American aid.

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